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Abstract: 
In accounting for the objects and properties of the manifest world, issues include the 
fundamentality, causal efficacy and ontological robustness of the dispositional 
(powers, potentials, capacities) versus the non-dispositional (categorical, qualitative). 
Concerning fundamentality, the available options seem to be that: (i) dispositional and 
categorical properties are different kinds, both fundamental; (ii) dispositional and 
categorical properties are one and the same, and fundamental; (iii) only categorical 
properties are fundamental while dispositional properties, if they exist, are higher-
order; and (iv) only dispositional properties are fundamental while categorical 
properties, if they exist, are higher-order. The viability of option (iv), a pure-power 
ontology, has met detracting arguments from several quarters. This paper outlines 
why the fourth option appears nonetheless attractive and provides a defence for its 
viability by suggesting how the manifestly qualitative world can be explained without 
recourse to fundamental categorical properties.  
                                                 
1 I thank Merin Nielsen for providing the initial idea of circulating networks. I also thank Phil Dowe for  
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 Introduction 
This paper focuses on what kinds of entities are required at the fundamental level to 
provide a satisfactory explanation for the manifest world. Two broad categories of 
entities include those that are categorical and those that are dispositional. Qualitative 
and/or categorical properties have generally been characterised in terms of spatially-
extended or space-occupying properties represented by Lockean primaries of size, 
shape, solidity and so on (Locke, 1924 II, Ch.VIII, 8, 66). Charles Martin, for 
example, describes qualitative properties as those needed for things to be perceived, 
providing the ‘what’ or ‘shell’ of objects (Martin, 1997, 222-223); and John Heil 
describes them as what individuates or differentiates powers (Heil, 2007, 84). Other 
descriptions view their status as ‘actual’ or ontologically-robust (Place, 1996), or 
focus on their self-containment in terms of ‘completeness’ in their instantiation. David 
Armstrong describes their nature as ‘exhausted’ in their instantiation by particulars, 
whereby they do not reserve of themselves for further interactions with other 
particulars (Armstrong, 1989, 118; 1997, 41, 69, 245). Alexander Bird describes them 
as properties that have primitive identity (Bird, 2007, 45).2 Dispositional properties 
have often been contrasted to categorical properties in all of the descriptive contexts 
above. (The focus in this paper concerns the metaphysical difference between the two, 
rather than a merely predicative differentiation.)  
 Concerning fundamentality, the available options seem to be that: 
(i) dispositional and categorical properties are different kinds, both fundamental; 
                                                 
2 A considerable body of literature is dedicated to teasing out the differences between ‘qualitative’ and 
‘categorical’ properties, and their opposition to dispositional properties. However, this paper uses the 
terms ‘categorical’ and ‘qualitative’ quite generally, leaving aside more subtle distinctions. Likewise 
for the term ‘dispositional’. To avoid the complexities relating to the ascription and counterfactual 
nature of dispositionality, this paper employs its ontologically-robust sense interchangeably with the 
term ‘power’. 
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 (ii) dispositional and categorical properties are one and the same, and fundamental; 
(iii) only categorical properties are fundamental while dispositional properties, if they 
exist, are higher-order; and (iv) only dispositional properties are fundamental while 
categorical properties, if they exist, are higher-order.  
 In Part 1 of this paper I explore the first three of these broad positions by 
utilising representative cases for each. The first option is a dualist conception of 
properties represented in this paper by an examination of the New Essentialist 
approach of Brian Ellis. The second option is representative of the Identity Theory of 
Properties discussed by Charles Martin and John Heil. The third option is 
encapsulated in David Armstrong’s Categoricalism.  
 I argue that, in light of the problems that inhere in the first three of these 
options, the fourth appears attractive. Nonetheless, there has been considerable 
criticism of this Strong Dispositionalism, including the regress arguments outlined 
and discussed by Bird (Bird, 2007, 99-146). Part 2 of this paper specifically focuses 
on the Swinburne and neo-Swinburne regress arguments which together assert that, 
without fundamental categorical properties, pure power theories are unable to account 
for the ostensibly qualitative world. I answer this charge by providing a 
counterexample that describes how the manifestly qualitative world might be 
explained without recourse to fundamental categorical properties. 
 
Part 1: Fundamental categorical properties  
What follows is a brief examination of Dualism, the Identity Theory of Properties, and 
Categoricalism.  
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 1.  Dualism  
Option (i) is exemplified by dualist theories such as New Essentialism, advocated by 
Brian Ellis3 (Ellis, 2001b, 2002), in which dispositional and categorical properties 
represent distinct kinds of fundamental entities. Although both types of property are 
mutually exclusive in terms of the categorical being structural and the dispositional 
being non-structural (Ellis, 2002, 70), fundamental categorical properties (or 
dimensions) play a causal role in the operation of powers (Ellis, 2001b, 9-10; 2005, 
470). This role is to direct how the effects of causal power are distributed (Ellis, 
2001a, 2008). When a causal process occurs, the effect is to change the value of 
certain dimensions, and Ellis describes these dimensions as ‘respects in which things 
may be the same or different’ (Ellis, 2008). These dimensions include, for example, 
quantities, size, shapes, duration, direction, spatiotemporal separation, position and 
time (Ellis, 2001b, 136-138; 2008). They are ‘presupposed’ by the causal powers and 
are thus fundamental (Ellis, 2008). Nonetheless, the causal powers, capacities and 
propensities of the fundamental natural kinds are not reducible to the dimensions 
(Ellis, 2001b, 138; 2005, 470). Rather, they are, themselves, also fundamental (Ellis, 
2001b, 128). For now I will put aside questions concerning how fundamental 
properties can be ontologically dependent upon other entities for their existence, as 
Ellis seems to propose (2001b, 138, 218; 2002, 70; 2005, 470-471). Instead, I 
concentrate on what is described overall: Fundamental categorical and fundamental 
dispositional properties4, both irreducible to the other, but which share a dependency 
                                                 
3 First posited jointly with Caroline Lierse (Ellis & Lierse, 1994). 
4  Causal powers are properties involved in physical causal processes and energy transmission. 
Capacities and potentials are dispositional properties, but do not necessarily involve transmission of 
energy (Ellis, 2008).  
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 relationship such that the categorical dimensions specify the range of effects wielded 
by the causal powers, and are ‘presupposed’ by them.  
 Importantly, it is the constraint imposed by the dimensions—the fact that they 
are respects in which things can or cannot change—that presumably provides their 
identity as structural properties, and thus, as categorical. But this is compromised by 
the fact that Ellis also considers the causal powers and capacities to be dimensions. 
His reasoning is that, like categorical dimensions, causal powers and capacities also 
represent ‘respects in which things can be the same or different’ (Ellis, 2008).  
 Given that both dispositional and categorical properties represent dimensions, 
being a dimension per se does not render a property categorical. So, if not the fact of 
being a dimension, what does determine the difference between Ellis’s fundamental 
categorical and fundamental dispositional properties? Ellis claims that categorical 
properties are quiddistic in the sense discussed by Bird and Robert Black, in that they 
have some ‘nature’ independent of their causal roles (Bird, 2006; Black, 2000; Ellis, 
2002, 70; 2008). So although the fundamental properties do play a causal role (Ellis, 
2005, 470), what supposedly provides them their identity as categorical is something 
over and above that role.  
 Hence, on one hand, their identity is given apart from their causal role, by 
what they are rather than by what they do. On the other hand, it is only in virtue of 
their causal role that we can recognise these categorical properties, since, as Ellis 
notes, if they had no ability to engage in a causal process leading to our perception of 
them, we could not know anything about such categorical properties (Ellis, 2001a). 
The role these categorical dimensions play, as ‘pure forms of physical structure’, is to 
restrict, constrain and inform the kinds of effects that causal powers can wield (Ellis, 
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 2002, 174). Ellis suggests that things possess categorical dimensions which change in 
response to the action of causal powers. These changes, together with our innate 
capacity to learn from experience about the pattern of distribution of these causal 
powers (Ellis, 2008), allows us to infer the existence of the categorical dimensions. 
Hence, the recognition of categorical properties depends at least partly on their causal 
role.  
 It can be argued that a deep inseparability of the quiddity and causal role of 
categorical properties exists. Let us suppose, as suggested by Ellis, that the role of 
categorical dimensions is to constrain and direct causal power by limiting how they, 
themselves, can be changed. In this case, how the change can or cannot occur, and 
thus what the causal powers can or cannot do, seems ‘built-in’ to what the dimensions, 
themselves, are. The situation is not remedied, but instead exasperated, by the fact of 
their causal role being inextricably tied to their ostensible quiddity, since it appears to 
render the very ‘structural nature’ of the dimensions as essentially powerful.  
 Ellis explains that change occurs via laws of action and reaction, these laws 
defined as the ‘detailed specification’ of the categorical dimensions (Ellis, 2005, 470); 
descriptions of the essential nature of natural kinds (Ellis, 2002, 59). However, relying 
on the laws of action and reaction, to explain why or how the dimensions change as 
they do, does not rescue the dimensions from being essentially dispositional. On one 
hand, if the essential nature of the dimensions is quiddistic, an explanation is lacking 
for why the laws, as specifications or descriptions of these categorical dimensions, 
should or could bring about changes. On the other hand, if the laws entail changes in 
accordance with some nature of their own or in virtue of the nature of causal powers, 
then the causal role of the categorical properties is over-determined—occupied by the 
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 laws. Remedying the overdetermination by removing the causal role from the 
categorical dimensions re-admits the difficulty of how the categorical dimensions may 
be perceived or discerned in the first place. Armstrong has argued the incompatibility 
of categorical properties and necessary laws. ‘It looks as though these structural 
properties must have some “causal role”’, he writes, ‘And will they not have that role 
contingently only? Not being powers, they do not necessitate any particular causal 
role’ (Armstrong, 2001; Ellis, 2002, 170).  
 Given the difficulty in providing a purely quiddistic identity for the categorical 
dimensions, might it not be better to bite the bullet and claim them as fundamentally 
powerful? This is the idea behind Bird’s (Bird, 2005a; 2007, 161-168) and Stephen 
Mumford’s (Mumford, 2004, 188) suggestion that the claim for fundamental structure 
being categorical may be merely a matter of theoretical perspective. They observe, for 
example, that classical accounts, that treat spacetime as ‘background’, contribute to 
the assumption that structure is categorical. Considering distance in Newton’s Law of 
Gravity: F = Gm1m2/r2, Mumford suggests that the force could be a manifestation of 
spatial separation just as readily as a manifestation of the respective masses, since the 
equation itself makes no distinction between what is categorical and what is 
dispositional (or powerful). The quantised field of Quantum Mechanics side-steps the 
relational spacetime of General Relativity in favour of returning to an absolute frame 
of reference for spacetime, also contributing to the idea that if spacetime is quantised 
at the fundamental levels, such ‘structure’ must be considered in terms of some kind 
of fixed background. However, as Bird notes, a concept of spacetime as a fixed 
geometry and metric leads to the idea of structure at fundamental levels being passive 
rather than active, and thus to claiming spacetime structure as categorical rather than 
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 powerful (Bird, 2005a, 458). However, times are changing and theoretical 
perspectives with them. Much of the recent theorising behind quantum gravity 
research has been driven by the recognition that providing a background-free 
geometry is vital to successfully uniting the gravitational force with the electro-weak 
and strong forces at some fundamental level (Bilson-Thompson, 2005; Bilson-
Thompson et al., 2009; Bilson-Thompson et al., 2007; Smolin, 1997, 2000, 2006). 
These theoretical models imply that fundamental structure can be given in relational, 
or purely powerful, terms.  
 In light of current scientific endeavours, there is good reason to suggest that 
structure is itself powerful. Meanwhile, the argument Ellis provides for holding 
fundamental structure to be categorical is largely to satisfy the demands of the 
Swinburne regress argument. As I will argue in Part 2 of this paper, however, it is not 
transparent that the ostensible qualitative world requires the existence of fundamental 
categorical properties.  
 
2.  Identity Theory of Properties 
Recognising the difficulties incurred by positing two distinct types of property at the 
fundamental level, Charles Martin (Martin, 1993, 1996b, 1996c; 1997, 216; Martin & 
Heil, 1999) and John Heil (Heil, 2003, 111-112; 2005a, 2005b), attempt to identify the 
two. Couching the identity in language that downplays the mutual exclusivity of the 
traditional dispositional and categorical dichotomy, they replace the term ‘categorical’ 
with ‘qualitative’ (Heil, 2003, 111-112). Martin posited an earlier version of the 
theory—known as the Limit or Dual-aspect Theory—which he later clarified in terms 
of the Identity Theory of Properties. This theory utilises the idea of fundamental 
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 ‘power-qualities’, which are at once qualitative and powerful (Heil, 2003, 2005b; 
Martin, 1996c, 136; 1997). Like an ambiguous drawing (Martin, 1997, 216-217), or a 
Necker Cube (Heil, 2003, 120), the qualitative ‘face’ or ‘side’, respectively, provides 
the ‘shell’, and the dispositional ‘face’ or ‘side’ indicates what the bearers of these 
power-qualities ‘do’. Importantly, whether the power-quality appears categorical or 
dispositional will depend on how we ‘differently consider’ it (Heil, 2003, 112).  
  
2.1 Dual versus Single Natures 
The possibility of two viable ways to consider a power-quality leaves the impression 
that neither the dispositional nor the qualitative can be abolished. They thus appear as 
two different ‘natures’ (Sparber, 2006), each uniquely contributing to the world. The 
uniqueness of the contribution is evidenced by the criticism that Martin and Heil make 
of the monist theories of Armstrong and Shoemaker—criticism on the grounds that 
each fails to supply something crucial of the dispositional and qualitative respectively 
(Heil, 2003, 76, 111-112, 120; 2005a, 352-353; Martin, 1996c; 1997, 213-216; Martin 
& Heil, 1999, 47-48). Purely non-qualitative worlds, for example, those in which 
relations and relata are interdependent (Heil, 2003, 104), deny room for the 
counterfactual nature of dispositions. They thereby require the reduction of possibility 
to the merely epistemological (Heil, 2003, 99-113). Like Ellis, Heil and Martin draw 
on the Swinburne regress argument, suggesting that a world that has no fundamental 
categorical properties would not provide enough conceptual resources to allow us to 
experience the manifestly qualitative world of objects with shapes, size, motion, 
solidity and so on (Heil, 2003, 98; Martin, 1997, 222-223). The claim for qualitative 
properties relies on the premise that even if properties like shape, position, duration, 
 9
 divisibility and solidity, of themselves, could be accounted for dispositionally, then 
the qualitative would still be required with respect to how these properties are 
detected. Importantly, this claim indicates that the dispositional lacks something 
which is provided by the qualitative.  
 Purely qualitative worlds are also criticized on the ground that they lack 
modality (Martin, 1993; 1996a, 174-177; 1996c, 127-129), would be undetectable 
(Heil, 2003, 118) and overdetermine the role of dispositions because the qualitative 
properties and/or laws do all of the causal work. Here we have the converse of the 
above: the qualitative lacks something which is provided by the dispositional.  
 It can be nothing other than supposing that the dispositional and categorical 
each bring something unique to the world that fuels Martin’s and Heil’s criticism of 
monist stances which each lack either the qualitative or the dispositional. They assert 
that the qualitative and the dispositional are both required to adequately explain the 
manifest world (Martin & Heil, 1999, 47). Since there is something unique about each, 
it would seem that the two cannot be of the very same nature. This is particularly the 
case since the dispositional and qualitative are claimed to be equally basic, intrinsic, 
and irreducible to each other (Heil, 2005b; Martin, 1996c, 132-133; Martin & Heil, 
1999, 48). This pushes in the direction of a robust distinctness, but the Identity Theory 
denies such a distinction. The strict identity (Heil, 2003, 111) of the dispositional and 
categorical indicates that the two are really a unitary ‘one and the selfsame property’ 
that cannot be prised apart (Martin, 1997, 216).   
 Assertions that the qualitative and dispositional are one and the self-same 
property raises the issue of the seemingly unique nature of each. In particular, when 
we differentiate between the categorical and dispositional in our consideration process, 
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 do we distinguish between them in virtue of some ontologically-robust feature that is 
either built into either the property itself or the physical context of the property; or do 
we make the distinction merely in virtue of the way we perceive the property? That is, 
does our ‘differently considering’ power-qualities in terms of qualitative or 
dispositional reduce to epistemology? In their discussion on picture theory (Heil, 
2007; Martin, 1997, Heil, 2003 #1386), both Martin and Heil deny this claim, 
insisting that there is some truthmaker that underpins the fact of the different ways we 
can consider properties.  
 Whatever this truthmaker might be, if there is something in the property itself 
which leads us to differentiate the qualitative from the dispositional, then clearly each 
contributes uniquely to producing different effects in a perceiver, belying the claim 
that the two are identical.  
 If not something in the property itself, can the truthmaker be found in the 
physical context in which the property (or more correctly, the property-bearer) 
subsists? Martin could be read as heading in this direction when he writes: ‘The 
physical environment and the individual human mind should be considered to be 
reciprocal disposition partners for the mutual manifestation of perception’ (Martin, 
1997, 213). This option suffers from the same difficulty as the above; namely, it falls 
short of explaining why the same physical context should allow the self-same 
property to be perceived in two completely different ways.  
 Can differing functional roles, pace Stephen Mumford (Mumford, 1998) then, 
explain why we differentiate the dispositional and qualitative dependent upon how we 
consider the power-quality? Depending upon the reference to a property’s functional 
roles, we appropriate one term or the other. Accordingly, whether considering a 
 11
 property to be qualitative or dispositional at any point in time will be closely tied to 
the function upon which we are focused at that time. If the focus is on, for example, 
how one property is individuated from another (e.g. sphericity from bigness), then the 
property is viewed as qualitative. The very same property can be considered 
dispositional when referring to its function of bestowing power on its bearer (e.g. in 
virtue of being spherical, a ball can roll). I argue, however, that indexing qualitativity 
and dispositionality to difference in function still leads back to the same difficulty in 
explaining why one and the same property gives rise to two different functional roles.  
 The power-quality described in the Identity Theory is not some complex or 
conjoint property. (A dual-aspect theory would face Armstrong’s criticisms 
concerning how the two are joined together in a property (Armstrong, 1997, 83-84).) 
So in principle, the unification of the dispositional and qualitative into such a property 
seems to present a monist position. However, accepting the contributions of the 
qualitative and the dispositional as unique raises questions concerning how to then 
explain and justify their purported strict identity.  
 
2.2 Non-relational Dispositionality 
The identity of the dispositional and qualitative in the power-quality implies the 
imposition of the qualitative upon the dispositional; and since the qualitative is 
intrinsic and non-relational, so too must be the dispositional. The non-relational status 
of dispositions is consistent with the separation of dispositional properties from their 
manifestations (Heil, 2007, 83). However, it also raises the question of how these 
dispositions might differ from Armstrongian-style categorical properties (‘pure-
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 qualities’). Power-qualities are similarly self-contained, wholly-present, intrinsic, and 
distinct from the (contingent) relations that allow them to manifest.  
 In the case of complex objects, each constituent part bears dispositional 
properties, the manifestation of which contributes to the overall dispositional profile 
of the complex object (Heil, 2007, 84). The dispositional properties of each 
constituent part are separated from their manifestation-relation; likewise each 
resulting disposition. Proposing a distinctness between relations and dispositional 
properties removes the possibility of necessary connections between dispositions and 
their manifestation. For Heil, this lack of necessity applies both within and between 
complex objects. Although Martin and Heil are proponents of irreducible 
dispositionality, their contingent relations between properties seem to disallow it. 
Fundamental, irreducible dispositionality appears to go hand in hand with necessary 
relations which are continuous with each other via relations, or, in Ellis’s words, 
dispositional properties that ‘stretch out’ (Ellis, 2001b, 267). By ruling out 
dispositional properties that are continuous with their manifestation, the Identity 
Theory of Properties is under a burden to explain how non-relational power-qualities 
differ from pure-qualities, for both appear to rely on contingent relations at the 
fundamental level.  
 Heil’s answer draws on considerations of simplicity. Pure-qualities (if they 
exist) require contingent laws of nature linking them. Together these categorical 
properties and laws would bestow power on the property-bearers. In contrast, Heil’s 
power-qualities do not require contingent laws to bestow power, doing so through 
their own natures (Heil, 2003, 79) whose powers are ‘built into’ them (124). As I have 
just argued, however, it is unclear how non-relational power-qualities do bestow 
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 power upon their bearers by their own nature, if their dispositions require contingent 
links between the dispositional properties.  
 Heil claims that the ability for dispositions to bestow power is a brute fact 
(117). Nonetheless, he claims that this is no more mysterious than competing views, 
arguing that his position has the advantage over Categoricalism because his requires 
only a single brute fact—that ‘power-qualities bestow power on their bearers’—
whereas Armstrong presents both categorical properties and the laws of nature linking 
them, entailing at least two brute facts (117). As mentioned already, however, Martin 
and Heil also require an additional (contingent) relation to link dispositional 
properties. 
 Because Martin and Heil defend the existence of irreducible dispositionality, 
their thesis demands some explanation of how this irreducible dispositionality cashes 
out in terms of its power-qualities. If the difference between power-qualities and pure-
qualities lies in the ability of power-qualities to bestow power without contingent laws 
of nature, then some detail of the action of ‘bestowing’ is required. Otherwise the 
theory presents essentially a deus ex machine, leaving the notion of power-qualities 
incomprehensible.  
 
3. Categoricalism  
In contrast to New Essentialism and the Identity Theory of Properties, Armstrong’s 
categorical monism restricts the domain of ‘real’ properties to the purely categorical. 
Objects participate causally in the world by means of dispositional properties that 
supervene upon the categorical microstructure of their object-bearers. This 
supervenience, according to Categoricalism, depends upon prevailing, contingent laws 
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 of nature. Armstrong also defends a view of strong causality according to which 
connections exist between instances of cause and effect that, being instances of nomic 
types, amount to more than Humean regularities. Such a view faces the challenge of 
explaining where the necessity required of strong causation arises in a world devoid of 
irreducible dispositional properties.  
 One explanation may be found in the idea that Categoricalism, being a ‘soft 
theory of powers’ (Armstrong, 2004, 142), provides for the necessity via the laws of 
nature. Singular causation occurs between instances. Armstrong defines this as a 
certain state of affairs (the cause) bringing about a further state of affairs (the effect) 
(Armstrong, 1997, 218) via law-governed singular causation. Being law-governed, 
singular causation is not ‘mere regularity’ (Armstrong, 1997, 218). Since it is 
governed by relations between universals (repeatables), it is also nomic (Armstrong, 
1996b, 102). However, ‘lawful singularity’ is subject to a trilemma, as outlined by 
Armstrong (Armstrong, 2004, 128):  
 
(1) Singular causation is a relation ‘intrinsic to its pairs’(strong causation) 
(2) Singular causation is essentially law-governed 
(3) Laws are essentially general  
 
If singular causation is intrinsic (1), then it is local to the relata. But, by (2) and (3), 
law-governance indicates that this local relation is part of a wider system, so it cannot 
be strictly local. The problem is that causal relations link particulars (locally), but 
laws link universals (non-locally). 
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  Armstrong’s solution draws on the repeatability of universals (properties) such 
that connections exist between instances as well as between higher-order state-of-
affair types (Armstrong, 2004, 130, 133-134). Whereas the surface form describes 
connections between token events, the actual form is a connection between kinds of 
events, such that a law holding between states of affairs (instances) is really a causal 
connection between kinds (Armstrong, 2004, 134). Causal relations between instances 
of universals instantiate these higher-order laws but do not themselves constitute laws 
(Armstrong, 1997, 227). Because instances are instances of kinds, we may infer 
existence of laws via experience of the instances. But there is more than merely 
inferring from instances to laws. Ontic relations between the kinds ensure the 
relations between instances, with such necessitation supposedly provided by the laws. 
This would seem to make the laws, as relations between kinds, responsible for 
necessity. Yet, these laws do not exist over and above their instances, which would 
seem to make the relations between instances responsible for the necessity required 
for strong causation.  
 The apparent bootstrapping effect that emerges in this theory concerns some 
critics of Categoricalism, including Charles Martin Herbert Hochberg and Alexander 
Bird, who each argue that Categoricalism cannot successfully derive the required 
necessity. Martin focuses his criticism on the idea that laws ultimately supervene upon 
the relations between instances. According to Martin, necessity is inadvertently 
introduced into Armstrong’s Categoricalism via repeatability and thus connectability; 
these being ascriptions of irreducible dispositionality. Hochberg and Bird argue that 
reliance on laws as relations between kinds is untenable; and that passing 
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 responsibility back and forth between the instances and the kinds, although resulting 
in the appearance of necessity, actually fails to account for it.  
 
3.1 Martin’s Argument Concerning Connectability and Repeatability 
In Dispositions: A Debate (Crane, 1996) Armstrong describes the role of the laws 
thus:  
Let us now apply such a scheme to the case where a brittle glass is struck, and 
as a result shatters. The striking of the as yet unbroken glass may then be 
thought of as the instantiation of a very complex universal which, because 
there is a certain forward linking of universals, brings forth the glass in a 
shattered state (Armstrong, 1996a, 46).  
 
This ‘connecting’ or ‘forward linking’ of universals indicates to Martin that 
Armstrong sequesters something ‘in’ the first-order properties. The grounding of 
dispositional properties in categorical properties depends heaviliy on: i) properties 
being repeatables; and ii) repeatables forming regularities in virtue of being 
repeatables. Because property universals are repeatables, the relations between their 
instances will form a pattern, the same relations between the same universal instances. 
As Armstrong notes, ‘we can say that an F, simply in virtue of being an F, will bring 
forth a G’ (Armstrong, 1996b, 100). Martin (Martin, 1996a, 174-177; 1996c, 127-129) 
argues that Armstrong’s laws are strong and thus capable of ensuring the connections 
between the instances; but that the necessity built into Armstrong’s system cannot be 
accounted for in terms of purely categorical properties and relations. Although not 
explicitly recognised, there is irreducible dispositionality present in Armstrong’s 
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 ontology. Given that: i) the same universals will be linked in the same way each time; 
and ii) these links are external to the first-order properties that are their relata, Martin 
asks what makes the same links instantiate between the same properties each time? 
The answer seems to be that the properties are repeatables; but this indicates that it 
must be something ‘in the properties’ themselves that affords them to link repeatedly 
the same way each time. Yet, it cannot be ‘in’ the properties unless the properties are 
not distinct from the laws, in which case they are not ‘self-contained’, categorical 
properties. Thus, to rely on the repeatability of universals is to admit irreducible 
dispositionality into the ontology.  
   
3.2 Hochberg’s Criticism of N: Reliance on Ambiguity 
Armstrong’s relation of natural necessity, ‘N’, is described by Hochberg as occurring 
where, ‘a primitive higher-order causal relation between universals naturally entails 
corresponding specification’ (Hochberg, 1999b). When holding between two 
universals (or more correctly, two state of affairs types) F and G, we write N(F, G). 
But as Hochberg notes, Armstrong sees this as a higher-order state of affairs 
(Hochberg, 1999b, 485). Hochberg means that Armstrong’s laws are relations both 
between token atomic states of affairs (i.e. ‘this F’ and ‘this G’) and simultaneously 
between types of states of affairs (‘F’ and ‘G’). But Hochberg denies the logical 
possibility of the latter case if F and G do not exist except in their instantiations. 
Armstrong writes that laws ‘exist nowhere and nowhen except in their positive 
instantiations’ (Hochberg, 1999b, 239). There can exist, in ontologically-robust terms, 
a totality of token states-of-affairs of particular kinds. However, no such 
corresponding ontologically-robust state-of-affairs-type can exist if, as Armstrong 
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 proposes, laws exist only in their instances. The upshot is that there can exist an 
ontologically-robust relation between ‘this F’ and ‘this G’, but not between F and G; 
the relation between F and G as types can be only an abstraction from the totality of 
relations between instances.  
 Hochberg notes Armstrong’s claim that, because a relation between 
instantiated universal instances—higher-order or otherwise—is a state of affairs, laws 
are simultaneously both instantiated constituents of states of affairs and dyadic 
universals acting as ‘functors’, combining two universals to form another complex 
universal (Hochberg, 1999b, 485). For Hochberg, construing laws in both these ways 
is ‘misusing’ N by relying on its ambiguity to achieve an illusory goal:  
 
Fusing these distinct roles of the causal connection N, Armstrong has N(F,G) 
as a fact, a Husserlian law of nature that is the ontological ground for ‘all F’s 
are G’s’ stating a causal law, as opposed to an accidental generality, and as a 
property that is exemplified by particulars. This ambiguous use of N enables 
him to achieve the specification to a first order generality and its instances. 
But, like Husserl, he can provide no account of the entailment involved in 
deriving the universal generalization’ (Hochberg, 1999b, 486).  
 
 In truthmaker terms, we could take either a bottom-up or top-down approach. 
The bottom-up approach would let instances act as ultimate truthmakers for 
successive higher-order levels of instances and relations. In this case, a first-order 
relation, FaRGa, instantiating the law, N(F,G), serves as truthmaker for its own 
necessity, since the law supplying this necessity supervenes upon these first-order 
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 instances. Relations between instances also act as truthmakers for the necessary 
relations between instances (and higher-order instances) of types. But it is unclear 
how regularities of instances can act as truthmakers for something stronger than mere 
regularity.  
 The top-down approach would allow that, although we infer the existence of 
types via instances, the same types ensure the existence of the relations between 
instances. This approach appears, superficially, to solve the lack of necessity in the 
bottom-up approach. However, as pointed out by Hochberg, understanding types other 
than as abstractions from the totality of instances belies the claim that laws do not 
exist over and above their instances. If ontologically-robust relations between types 
do not exist, then they cannot be posited as ultimate truthmakers for the supposed 
necessity of the relations between instances. This would require a regress of higher- 
and higher-order instances of F and G to be truthmakers for lower-order relations, 
reaching no actual F and G existing apart from their instances. N(Fx, Gx) relies on a 
higher-order necessity holding between instances of universal types N (F, G), which 
relies on further higher-order necessity, passing on the burden of explanation ad 
infinitum (Hochberg, 1999a, 254).  
  Hochberg argues that Armstrong’s apparent necessity is an illusion born of 
juxtaposing the bottom-up and top-down approaches (Hochberg, 1999a, 244-274; 
1999b, 486-488; 2001, 299-317), producing a truthmaker for neither the relations 
between instances, independent of the higher-order laws; nor for types, independent of 
relations between instances. In Hochberg’s view, the law instances, the law regularity, 
and the law necessity must be treated separately, rather than as a fused notion. This 
means separating N(Fx, Gx) as a higher-order fact; N(Φx, Ψx) as a higher-order 
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 relation between universals; N(Fx, Gx) as a first-order universal that “contains” the 
relation N(Φx, Ψx); and N as a functor forming the universal from Fx and Gx 
(Hochberg, 1999a, 258-260; 1999b, 486; 2001, 301-303). However, this separation 
would require amendments to Armstrong’s laws. The next section outlines Bird’s 
formal characterisation of what kind of revision would be required, and why he 
believes that it would not be achievable within the framework of Categoricalism.  
   
3.3 Bird’s Formal Characterisation 
Bird’s argument follows from a summary of Armstrong LAWS (Armstrong, 1983, 
1997):  
LAWS: Laws of nature are contingent relations among natural properties 
(Armstrong 1983). If F and G are first-order universals, then a law relating 
them is the fact of a certain second-order universal relating F and G. We may 
call that second-order relation ‘N’, so that the law may be symbolized N(F,G). 
N has certain properties. For example: N(F,G) entails ∀x(Fx → Gx). Let us 
call the relation between F and G that holds whenever ∀x(Fx → Gx) the 
‘extensional inclusion relation’, symbolized thus: R(F,G). So N(F,G) entails 
R(F,G). However, R(F,G) does not entail N(F,G), since the relation of 
necessitation is not the same as nor coextensional with the relation of 
extensional inclusion. This is clear because there may be accidentally true 
generalizations without any corresponding law (Bird, 2005b, 147-148).  
 
Bird’s formal characterisation of Armstrong’s N: 
 (I) 〈N(F,G) entails 〈R(F,G)〉 
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 where N(F,G) is the relation of necessitation and R(F,G) is the extensional inclusion 
relation between instances. (I) tells us that wherever there is a necessitating relation, 
there is a relation. A general law, Armstrong’s relation between states of affairs types 
is just such a necessitating relation. N possesses a modal property, namely entailing, 
but because there might be accidental relations between instances of F and G, we also 
have:  
 (II) 〈P(F, G)〉 does not entail 〈R(F,G)〉 
where P(F,G) is a second-order relation that holds between F and G wherever 
possession of F raises the chances of G. Armstrong’s properties and relations, 
however, are categorical states of affairs and hence have no modal qualities. Being a 
second-order relation, P is, like all properties and relations in Armstrong’s ontology, 
categorical. As such, P does not necessitate G. If both N and P are nothing over and 
above their instances, then there is nothing to distinguish N from P, which are equally 
relations between instances. But N does necessitate G while P does not. We need an 
explanation for the necessitation in one and the lack of necessitation in the other.  
 The problem might be remedied, suggests Bird, by considering both (I) and 
(II) modal or non-modal. He offers two modifications, albeit observing that neither is 
satisfactory: 
 (I*) 〈N(F,G)〉 (merely) implies 〈R(F,G)〉 
and  (I**) 〈N(F,G)〉 (contingently) necessitates 〈R(F,G)〉. 
The (I*) modification drops entailment between the necessitating relation and the 
extensional inclusion relation, leaving Armstrong with only a regularity theory of 
laws rather than a causal theory of strong laws, which would be unacceptable to him. 
The (I**) modification makes N only contingent necessity. It provides a kind of 
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 necessity, but disallows entailment, dictating merely that a relation between this F and 
this G is necessary, given that the relation between F and G is necessary. Letting (I**) 
be represented by N' (N,R), as Bird notes, N' is then ‘something which explains, if N' 
(N,R), why whenever N(F,G) - and indeed makes it the case that N(F,G)’ ( 151). But 
N' is a higher-order analogue of N, and requiring a still higher analogue—N''—to 
explain N', requiring a higher analogue ad infinitum (Bird, 2005b, 151). Hence we get 
the same regress identified by Hochberg. 
 The theory of strong laws required by Armstrong’s Contingent Identity Thesis 
has proved to be problematic in terms of necessity, as discussed by Martin Hochberg 
and Bird. The repeatability of universals seems to implicitly invoke irreducible 
dispositionality in some form or other. Laws that are exemplified by necessary 
relations between instances would have truthmaker support in virtue of the necessity 
proposed at the instance-level. Necessary relations could exist only by virtue of 
irreducible dispositionality among the relata, ruling them out as categorical. However, 
laws consisting only in a totality of single instances require independent explanation 
for their existence if they are to warrant the instances of which they are comprised. 
Such independent explanation does not seem to be available in terms of higher-order 
types without postulating some end-point, perhaps like the transcendent Platonic ideal 
type, which is not legitimately categorical.  
 
Part 3: Pure power theories and regress arguments  
Thus far I have pointed out difficulties that arise when accommodating the existence 
of fundamental categorical properties, as required by the Swinburne regress and neo-
Swinburne arguments. New Essentialism proposes the existence of fundamental 
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 categorical properties whose identity is given in terms of the quiddity. However, the 
inability to tease out what these properties are from what they do in terms of both 
their causal role and their recognisability compromises their status as categorical. The 
difficulties that the Identity Theory of Properties faces resemble, in principle, those 
that other dual theories encounter; namely, the theoretical assumptions are informed 
by the dichotomy that underpins the concepts of the categorical and dispositional. 
Moreover, an explanation for how power-qualities significantly differ from 
Armstrongian pure-qualities is required to justify how irreducible dispositionality 
operates within the theory. Categoricalism is under the burden to provide an adequate 
account of the necessity it calls upon for strong laws, without building irreducible 
dispositionality into its fundamental properties. The challenge for Strong 
Dispositionalism is to answer the Swinburne regress by giving an account of how the 
manifestly qualitative world might be explained without recourse to fundamental 
categorical properties.  
 The aim of the next section is to shore up the position of the pure-power 
theorist by providing a counterexample to the Swinburne regress arguments that 
something categorical is required in order to achieve the qualitative world. 
 
3.1 Light-like Networks 
Traditionally, power has been assumed to require a categorical bearer in the form of 
some particular (or qualitative field) which acts in virtue of its power (Armstrong, 
1997, 69, 204-205; Martin, 1997, 197). The positions discussed thus far all hold that 
properties which bestow power to particulars depend in some way on the categorical. 
 The underlying impetus for asserting that powers require bearers comes from 
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 the notion that there must be some categorical space-occupier that is the recipient or 
antecedent of the action (or effect) of power. Given this traditional background, power 
is understandably defined (in metaphysics) as the ability that a property bestows upon 
its bearer to affect or be affected (Armstrong, 1997, 69).  
 Suppose the universe to be, however, a field of power, neither borne by 
categorical entities nor grounded in categorical properties. In this context, we may 
envisage the fundamental entities to be light-like processes that can exist in the form 
of subluminal speed networks. I will refer to this idea—just for the sake of 
convenience—as Light-like Network Theory. (This is not intended as a model of the 
actual world. Rather it offers a plausible account of categoricity in the manifest world, 
starting from a pure-power base.) 
 
3.1 Primitives 
In Light-like Network Theory, the basic ingredients are force carriers5 (or conceivably 
‘bits of force’ or more technically, gauge bosons or field fluctuations) which always 
travel at the speed of light and are not spatiotemporally bordered. The Standard Model 
of particle physics describes four types6 of gauge boson: photons (involved in the 
electromagnetic force), W and Z bosons (in the weak interaction), gluons (in the 
strong interaction) and gravitons (possibly involved in gravity7). 
                                                 
5 In referring to ‘individuals’, ‘entities’ and ‘particles’, I use the terms loosely, since I reject the notion 
of strict particle-hood. 
6 Actually, there are fewer than four, since the weak and electromagnetic forces have been shown to be 
different forms of the same, and it is posited that all the forces will eventually be resolved into one. 
7 Although not directly detected at this time. 
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  Since the worldlines of force carriers correspond to a spacetime interval of 
zero, they are neither continuously space filling nor persistent.8 Despite generating all 
of the hallmarks of the categorical, these force carriers fulfil the criteria of pure power.  
 In addition to force carriers, we could regard spacetime’s dimensional 
topology (incorporating length, breadth, height, time and how they interconnect) as a 
primitive. In our everyday experience, each spatial dimension represents an arbitrarily 
orthogonal direction of displacement. The existence of more dimensions would 
involve the availability of further orthogonalities.  
 Let us suppose, then, that the universe has a topology of both ‘open’ (e.g. 
length, breadth and height) and ‘closed’ (curled up or compacted) spatial dimensions, 
such that force carriers traverse more than the three everyday spatial dimensions, 
travelling also in the microscopic curled up dimensions. These are conjectured to 
constitute a built-in (although dynamic), micro-topology at every point in 
macroscopic space.  
 Since Light-like Network Theory treats dimensionality as fundamental, it is 
important to note that spacetime is not categorical in any sense of ‘bordering off’, 
‘directing’ or ‘containing’ power in the way that structure is portrayed in New 
Essentialism. Everyday dimensions, for instance, do not border off motion but 
facilitate it via three orthogonal directions. Motion among compacted dimensions 
would be likewise unbounded, and likewise in accord with local spacetime curvature, 
which is affected by the movement.   
                                                 
8 Indeed, there is no absolute fact as to how much spacetime is involved between occurrences of the 
absorption and emission events pertaining to the transmission of force, since this varies with the frame 
of reference. The extension of such worldlines can be invariantly characterised, however, in terms of 
‘action’, whose units are those of Planck’s constant. 
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  Navigating this labyrinth, force carriers may continually end up where they 
began in relation to some frame of reference, all the while penetrating the curled up 
dimensions, depending on their quantum mechanical properties (e.g. wavelength, spin, 
colour). 
 While it is initially useful to talk of field fluctuations being separate from the 
dimensional topology, they can be regarded as not strictly distinct. Rather, the 
dimensional orthogonalities together with field fluctuations could be inter-dependent 
and dynamically overlapping as each force carrier induces geometric curvature, 
modifying the range of orthogonalities ‘available’ to itself and others.9 
 Consider, for example, a convergence of photons that increases the energy 
density in some region. The consequently greater gravitational curvature changes how 
photons may be absorbed and emitted by that region. In this picture, spacetime 
structure is interdependent and to some degree interchangeable with gauge-boson 
activity. That is to say, the underlying field structure of intrinsic orthogonalities and 
the quantisable field features (gauge bosons) are not metaphysically distinct;. Thus, 
we might conceive of spacetime’s local topology as the primitive effect of field 
fluctuations interacting with each other. The relevant orthogonalities exist only in that 
they correspond to possible trajectories associated with force carriers; correlating to a 
range of available pathways within the topology of the compacted dimensions. Indeed, 
the conservation of lepton and baryon numbers is suggestive of inherent dimensional 
‘knotting’ within such a microtopology.  
                                                 
9 We might do better to think of the topology in terms of ‘metric-topology’, such that the topological 
discussion is understood in mathematical terms. However, this would be merely a matter of 
instrumental convenience. As far as furniture of the world is concerned, we can treat the topology and 
the energy of the system as essentially a unity. 
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  Conversely, the typology of force carriers may correspond to the 
differentiation of properties by topological orientation. Consider a field fluctuation, 
for example, moving exclusively through macroscopic 3-space as an oscillation of 
electromagnetic field components. This may represent a geometric or topological 
fluctuation in some compacted space orthogonal to the vector in 3-space. Such a 
fluctuation may have several simultaneous, independently variable orientations with 
respect to both 3-space and the ‘labyrinth’ of compacted spaces. Absorption and 
emission by the compacted dimensional micro-topology would be a matter of force 
carriers changing trajectory whereby their orientations, corresponding to physical 
quantities, are conserved.  
 Possible objections include that the close inter-dependence of the topology and 
force carriers sounds like a circular definition. This is unavoidable when talking about 
fundamentals since there is no way to describe them in terms more basic than 
themselves. But it is an acceptable, informative circularity rather than vicious, since it 
emphasises non-distinctness of the fundamental. Subject to scientific investigation, 
the dimensional topology and the field fluctuations could be mutually tailoring, each 
representing power rather than categorical constraint. A physical manifold naturally 
has both topological and geometrical aspects, where the latter may pertain to force 
carriers. Importantly, the close interaction of the force carriers and the topology 
supports a view of structure as powerful rather than categorical. 
 
3.2 Networks 
Let’s imagine, say, many gauge bosons coinciding in the micro-topology at the same 
macroscopic location. Although the gauge bosons travel at the speed of light and do 
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 not have rest mass, they form a self-sustaining network that on whole appears ‘massy’, 
travels at less than the speed of light, and supports, as higher-order phenomena, the 
qualitative properties of the manifest world. 
 The networks have rest mass in a way analogous to black holes having greater 
rest mass thanks to photons that they have absorbed. The emission or absorption of 
gauge bosons, involving ‘excited’ states of the networks, may occur in terms of 
competing energy density arrangements. Likewise, virtual particles may appear for 
short durations of time (within the constraints of the Heisenberg Principle), in the 
form of disturbances (Davies & Gribbin, 1992, 230-231).   
 So we can speculate that field fluctuations moving through the open 
dimensions (3-space) are absorbed and emitted as they enter or exit circulating 
networks of ‘sibling’ gauge bosons, which, based on geometry and/or topology, 
demand quantisation of their properties. As Gribbin describes it, a photon can be 
pictured as a ripple in the fifth dimension, a W boson might be a ripple in the 6th, a Z 
boson in the 7th and  so on, including combinations (Gribbin, 2007, 105-106).  
 A ‘barber pole effect’ illustrates how networks offer an explanation for 
massiness, even though the constituent force carriers travel at the speed of light and 
thus lack rest mass. (Stationary networks would be represented by a vertical barber 
pole in this figure). 
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 Figure 1: ‘Barber Pole’ Compared With Gauge Boson Path10 
 
Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a gauge boson circulating within one 
compacted dimension. The effect can be likened to a spiral on a barber pole, 
continually returning to the starting place in terms of space, although at successively 
later times. A cross-section of the barber pole is just a circle (or ellipse), the simplest 
compact space orthogonal to everyday 3-space. In a three-plus-one-dimensional 
universe, force carriers are restricted to light-like paths at 45o. However, if compacted 
dimensions are involved, then while a force carrier travels at the speed of light—
                                                 
10 Note: The barber pole leans over at angle arctan(v/c). If its radius were fixed, then the 45o spiral 
stripe (gauge boson path) would have a horizontal component greater than its vertical component—
contrary to physics. However, the components remain equal if the barber pole cross-section contracts in 
the direction of motion as per Special Relativity (SR). If x and y are the two respective spatial 
dimensions and t is that of time, then we have:  
v'x = (v – c sin(t)) / (1 – (v/c) sin(t)), and  
v'y = c cos(t) √1–(v/c)2 / (1–(v/c) sin(t)),  
such that (v'x)2 + (v'y)2 = c2 as required.  
This bears on the wavelength and thus the energy-momentum of the circulating gauge bosons in accord 
with E = E0 / √1-(ν/c)2 where E0 is the relevant absorption/emission energy in relation to a network at 
rest. (For further explanation of addition of velocities in SR, see Hartle, 2003, 71).  
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 maintaining a spacetime interval of zero in a five-plus-dimensional spacetime—it may 
circulate within some network whose displacement entails some velocity less than c.  
 
Figure 2: Network Trajectories of Gauge Bosons 
 
Figure 2 schematically shows how the velocity indicated by the lean of the barber 
pole varies depending upon how, relative to a frame of reference, gauge bosons travel 
through a one-dimensional compacted space. Barber pole A represents the path of a 
gauge boson through a network that is sitting still in space and persisting through 
time; B and C represent successively greater velocities; and for D the path is light-like.  
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 3.3 Networks as Conserved Quantities  
Conserved quantities are tied inextricably to fundamental force-fields, associated with 
gauge bosons. Theordore Kaluza and Oskar Klein (Kaluza, 1921, 971; Wuensch, 2003, 
527) opened up the possibility of accommodating conserved quantities, like charge, 
spin and energy-momentum in terms of extra compacted dimensions. Light-like 
Network Theory suggests understanding conserved quantities in relation to networks 
of circulating force carriers. 
 Kaluza-Klein Theory demonstrated how charge would emerge directly from 
the existence of one suitably compacted dimension. Depending on the geometry and 
topology of the compacted dimensions, it may be feasible to account for all the 
conserved quantities, which give rise to fields of force. Take, for example, the idea of 
charge, as an ‘energetic bit of the field’ (Gribbin, 2007, 61). As John Griffin notes, we 
may picture an electron as some charged, confined region of the spacetime field 
embedded in a sea of virtual photons (Gribbin, 2007, 64). Calculations show that the 
electromagnetic field around an electron creates virtual photons that are constrained 
by the uncertainty principle such that they can move only half the distance of their 
wavelength before being reabsorbed. 
 Krauss describes what has previously been thought ‘empty space’ to be a brew 
of boiling, bubbling, ‘particle-antiparticle pairs popping in and out of nothingness’ 
(Krauss, 2005, 108-109). We could go further, however, to envisage non-virtual 
photons being emitted and absorbed from a circulation network of compacted 
dimensions. As Icke notes, ‘the old problem: if an atom drops to a lower energy state 
and emits a photon, where was the photon before that? The answer…the photon was 
in another world, another “abstract space”, and has become apparent at the juncture 
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 between the space(s) containing the single electron’ (Icke, 1995, 182). LNT posits this 
‘other space’ to be the micro-topological compacted dimensions.  
 In terms of the promised counter-argument: If an electron—representative of a 
fermion; the kinds of ‘particles’ most often associated with the manifestly qualitative 
world—were described as a set of conserved quantities partly constituted by a field of 
‘virtual’ photons, this would be without recourse to anything categorical.  
 The story so far allows for fermions to be constituted from a pure power base, 
and from which we might build the manifestly substantial world. If so, a credible 
picture of fermions deriving from fundamental power completes the link between 
such a base and the world of our senses. Even without further analyse of such 
networks to show how they might interact to represent particles and more complex 
objects, one goal of the paper has been met, i.e. to present a counterexample to the 
Swinburne regress. Simply by demonstrating that if such networks existed, then they 
could plausibly correspond to fermionic entities, regress-type claims against the pure-
power view are considerably weakened.11  
 
3.4 So, explaining the Qualitative Manifest World [slide click] 
The Swinburne regress and neo-Swinburne arguments claim that fundamental 
categorical properties are required for us to perceive the world we live in. Why? 
Because we are subject to an intuitively forceful distinction of the ontological status 
between arrangements of events in space (qualitative) and those in time 
(dispositional); that is, because we naturally perceive ‘structure’ in terms of spatial 
                                                 
11 In this view, whereby fermions are ultimately ‘made of’ gauge bosons, the micro-topology must 
somehow account for bosonic whole-integer spin providing half-integer spin. Certain lines of 
speculation are open, but go beyond the scope of this paper. 
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 definition. I conjecture that this is really a bias arising from the dimensional 
asymmetry of spacetime which sustains networks of gauge bosons that, detouring 
through micro-topological compacted dimensions, momentarily enter and exit 
everyday 3-space. Continually doing so across sufficiently short separations (in 
connection with Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle12), we may suppose such constant 
circulation networks to be ‘self-replicating’ through time, thereby persisting.  
 ‘Concrete’ particles thus arise from the continual self-replication of networks, 
clusters of which appear as fermionic matter. As self-sustaining spatial arrangements 
of conserved physical quantities, the resulting, apparent ‘stuff’ extends ‘gratuitously’ 
through time, upon which entropy imposes a well-defined direction.  
 Ultimately, however, we ourselves are likewise spatially confined networks 
(very complex barber poles), and therefore ‘primed’ by the expediency of self-
preservation to perceptually encounter the world in terms of interacting with other 
particle-like networks, whose vectors give rise to the intuition of spatial primacy. The 
dimensional asymmetry of spacetime is thus translated into a bias toward identifying 
‘structure’ as spatially located, categorical ‘substance’. 
 
3.5 Summary and Conclusion  
 Field fluctuations would otherwise travel along geodesic paths in 3-space, but the 
compacted, tangent spaces permanently circulate them through a multi-dimensional 
micro-topology whose local structure is influenced by the field fluctuation properties, 
perhaps primarily orientation, in a variety of specific spatiotemporal arrangements. 
The resulting networks are also force carrier absorbers and emitters. Any given 
                                                 
12 ∆ρ×∆s ≤ Planck’s constant. Shorter separations provide for greater uncertainty in momentum and 
other quantities, perhaps contributing to network stability. 
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 network, which as a whole must travel slower than the speed of light, represents a 
concentration of energy-momentum with rest mass and other associated properties, 
identifiable by type such as some conserved quantity, e.g. charge. 
 If the existence of fermions, such as electrons—interpreted as charged regions 
of virtual photons—can be construed as manifestations of the field, so the field might 
be construed as ontologically prior to fermions. Consequently, at fundamental levels, 
there can be an absence of rest mass and pure spatial or pure temporal extension, and 
yet at supervening levels the appearance of massy networks gives rise to the 
manifestly qualitative world. Thus, Light-like Network Theory conforms to Rovelli’s 
recognition that matter and spacetime cannot be fruitfully distinguished (Rovelli, 1997, 
191-195); and Alexander Bird’s claim that spacetime structure should be considered 
powerful (Bird, 2005a). Categorical objects could therefore be complex composites of 
fundamental field fluctuations that interact with respect to extra-dimensional 
orthogonalities. This would account for the manifested qualitative world in pure 
power terms, without fundamental categorical properties.  
 The ostensible spatial priority of the world obtains through spacetime’s 
numerical asymmetry—several spatial dimensions versus one time dimension—
permitting things to ‘sit still’ in space but not in time, and affording our intuitive 
attribution of different ontological status. Light-like Network Theory conjectures that 
the substantial objects of the world are actually complex, higher-order manifestations 
of pure power in the form of basic field fluctuations (force carriers) interacting in 
relation to extra, micro-topological orthogonalities. That is, the objects of the world, 
including ourselves, are very complex barber poles. 
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